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SUNSHINE AND ILL WIND: THE FORECAST FOR
PUBLIC ACCESS TO SEALED SEARCH WARRANTS
INTRODUCTION
In order for American citizens to engage in intelligent debate and to make
expedient political choices, it is essential that they have knowledge of their
government's activities.' To ensure a knowledgeable electorate, the public" has
been given access,' either through statute or by the courts, to governmental
functions and documents such as congressional hearings, memoranda of gov-
ernment agencies, and criminal trials.' However, the public also has had lim-
1. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that in order to be valuable, public debate must be informed); Saxbe v. Washington Post,
417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("What is at stake here is the societal func-
tion of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No
aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection of the ability
of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny."). As the
Solicitor General noted:
[The] first amendment is one of the vital bulwarks of our national commitment to
intelligent self-government. It embodies our Nation's commitment to popular self-de-
termination and our abiding faith that the surest course for developing sound national
policy lies in free exchange of views on public issues. And public debate must not only
be unfettered; it must also be informed.
Id. (citation to petitioner's brief omitted).
2. In most public access cases, media outlets such as television broadcasters or newspapers are
the parties seeking access to government-held information. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965). The media, however, is treated like a member of the public according to the prevailing
court analysis. Id. at 533. Thus the media gets no special access rights as far as the First Amend-
ment is concerned. In Estes, the Court held that the publicity surrounding the defendant's trial
violated his due process right to a fair trial. The Court, in its opinion, stated:
Once beyond the confines of the courthouse, a news-gathering agency may publi-
cize, within wide limits, what its representatives have heard and seen in the court-
room. But the line is drawn at the courthouse door; and within, a reporter's constitu-
tional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public.
Id. at 589. But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (advancing special access rights for the press, finding that the press "'acts as an agent of the
public at large,' each individual member of which cannot obtain for himself 'the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.'" (quoting Saxbe, 417 U.S. at
863 (Powell, J., dissenting)); Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Jour-
nalists' Right of Access to Places, 52 Mo. L. REV. 751 (1987) (advocating special access rights
for the media).
3. "Access" means both the ability to review government records as well as the ability to actu-
ally attend a governmental function.
4. There exist both state and federal access statutes that function to guarantee access to gov-
ernment-held information. See Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (out-
lining the duty of government agencies to make available agency rules, opinions, orders, records,
and proceedings); 2 BURT BRAVERMAN & FRANCES J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW: FREEDOM
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ited access rights to areas such as federal prisons 5 or grand jury proceedings,
when the value of public access is outweighed by governmental interests. 7
Our nation's judicial system, which protects the rights of citizens and adju-
dicates their disputes, is a bulwark of a free and democratic government.8
Since the judiciary plays such an important role in our society, the public has
often sought access to judicial proceedings and records.9 Access to the Ameri-
can court system has been the focus of several Supreme Court decisions in the
past decade. During this period, the Court has recognized that the public has
a qualified First Amendment right of access to trials and certain pretrial pro-
ceedings. 10 However, the Court has yet to determine whether there is a quali-
fied First Amendment right of access to judicial records, a right guaranteed to
a lesser degree by the common law.1"
OF INFORMATION, PRIVACY, OPEN MEETINGS, OTHER ACCESS LAWS, 18th app. at 113-17 (1985)
(listing state open record statutes). Courts have guaranteed access to governmental processes such
as trials. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
5. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that the media has no right of
access to prisons beyond that allowed to the public generally).
6. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 397 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that "grand jury proceedings
traditionally have been held in strict confidence"); id. at 437 (Blackmun J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (commenting on the secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings). But see But-
terworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381-82 (1990) (invalidating a Florida law prohibiting a
witness from disclosing his or her own testimony after the grand jury has been discharged). See
generally JOHN J. WATKINS, THE MASS MEDIA AND THE LAW 283 (1990) (reviewing the status of
access rights to grand juries).
7. See Gannett, 438 U.S. at 400-02.
8. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592 (1980).
9. See id. (implying that the public exercises its access rights as a check and balance on the
courts). See generally Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830 (1978) (newspa-
per seeking access to judicial review commission); Nebraska Press Assoc. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
541 (1976) (media seeking access to a criminal defendant's pretrial confessions and admissions);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 473 (1975) (where a rape victim's name was
taken from the judicial records and publicized by a media broadcaster); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 344 (1966) (where media gained access to criminal trial).
10. The Court first recognized the qualified First Amendment right of access to trials in Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555. This qualified right was extended to pretrial proceedings in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I).
The Supreme Court has always been more willing to find rights of access to courts, rather than
to other governmental functions. One year before finding a right of access to trials in Richmond
Newspapers the Court denied access to federal prisons in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I
(1978). Justice Stevens in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence noted the Court's inconsistency
in these two cases, especially considering that access to prisons would help protect one of the
weakest segments of the country (prisoners) and that the access to prisons was denied despite the
lack of a legitimate justification for closure, whereas granting access to trials protected the most
powerful voice in the community, the media. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583-84 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
11. The Court ruled in Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978), that no First
Amendment right of access to judicial records existed, although a common law right of access to
judicial records existed. Id. at 597-99; see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing
the legal differences between a First Amendment right of access and a common law right of
access). The validity of the Nixon Court's determination that no First Amendment right of access
432 [Vol. 41:431
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As the courts gradually clarified a constitutional right of access to trials, the
public has sought to broaden that right to include judicial documents and judi-
cial proceedings other than trials.1" Among the judicial documents the public
has sought access to are executed search warrants, particularly those relating
to massive government investigations.' Public access to sealed search warrants
has been the subject of much recent litigation; in the last few years several
circuit courts of appeals have reviewed access requests from media petitioners
to sealed search warrants that have been executed on persons who had not yet
been charged with crimes."'
Unfortunately, these courts have used dissimilar analyses to determine
whether a qualified right of access to search warrants exists, and they have
reached varying conclusions on the question. 5 In these cases the search war-
rants were sealed by the issuing court or magistrate pursuant to a governmen-
tal request at the post-execution, pre-indictment stage."0 The media petitioners
then sought to have the sealing orders revoked, so that the information in the
search warrants and their accompanying affidavits could be disseminated by
to judicial records exists is questionable following the holdings of Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
12. Lower courts have extended the right of access to other proceedings and documents on
occasion. See Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir.
1988) (pretrial detention hearings); In re Washington Post, 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986)
(plea and sentencing hearings); Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143,
1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (pretrial documents in general).
13. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60,'62 (4th Cir. 1989) (a newspaper seeking infor-
mation on a governmental investigation of fraud in the health care industry); Times Mirror Co. v.
United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1989) (a newspaper seeking information on a gov-
ernmental investigation of fraud in a defense contracting company); In re Search Warrant for
Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1988) (same).
14. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir.1989); Times Mirror Co. v. United
States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside office
of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
15. See Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 63-65 (finding a common law right of access but no First
Amendment right of access); Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217-19 (finding no First Amendment or
common law right of access); In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 571 (finding a First Amendment right of
access).
16. Generally the government does not file search warrants under seal and thus the media nor-
mally has access to them. However, litigation resulted because of the sealing orders in these par-
ticular cases. Some fear exists that without higher court messages discouraging lower courts from
entering the sealing orders, the government will request sealing orders on all search warrants,
regardless of how they perceive the importance of secrecy under the circumstances. Some courts
have commented that sealing orders requested by the government are already "proliferating," thus
denying the press a freedom to report on governmental activities. See Seattle Times Co. v.
Eberharter, 713 P.2d 710, 717-18 (Wash. 1986) (Andersen, J., concurring) (citing Kevin C.
Dwyer & Peter G. Rush, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1983,
DUKE L.J. 377 (1984)). The proliferation of sealing orders has certainly occurred in civil court-
rooms, particularly in the area of complex litigation where sealing orders can cover all pretrial
discovery material, the contents of pleadings, trial testimony, trial exhibits, and terms of settle-
ment. See Brian T. FitzGerald, Note, Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly
Private, 6 J.L. & POL. 381, 382-83 (1990) (criticizing the increased use of sealing orders in civil
litigation).
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the public.1 7 The disclosure of the warrants and affidavits was opposed, in most
instances, by the government and the searched, unindicted individuals. 18 Thus,
in the typical search warrant access case, the public, the government, and the
searched individual all have separate interests they seek to protect. The media,
acting as an arm of the public, asserts an interest in preserving the American
system of self-government that would be facilitated by open access to govern-
mental functions and documents, such as sealed search warrants. On the other
hand, the government typically resists access, declaring an interest in criminal
investigations and prosecution. A third interest exists in the form of the
searched individual's privacy concern. The search warrant access cases provide
a unique conflict between some of the most esteemed values treasured by the
citizens of this country: their right to know, their right to privacy, and their
ability to live in a crime-free society.
Section One of this Comment traces the history of the "right to know" doc-
trine and will demonstrate how courts have found both a First Amendment
and common law right of access to judicial proceedings, and a common law
right of access to judicial documents. Section One then examines the right of
access to sealed search warrants and the various interests involved in the typi-
cal search warrant access case. Section Two analyzes the various methodolo-
gies used by courts in the search warrant access cases to determine access
rights and to evaluate critically the divergent interests of the media, the gov-
ernment, and the searched individual. Section Two then argues that the
framework used by courts for determining the value of a right of access to
sealed search warrants is inappropriate, and that a presumption of access to
the warrants under a common law right of access should exist. Section Two
further contends that the common law right of access merits strict application,
so that any requests to sealed documents such as search warrants would be
closely scrutinized. Finally, Section Two discusses the impact that the current
system of access determination has on our self-government principles and why
access is fundamental to a representative democracy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Basis for a Right to Know
The right of access to courts emanates from the idea that the public has a
right to know. Scholars specializing in self-government and free speech theory
argue that the right to know is important for a representative democracy be-
cause the only way citizens can govern themselves is to "know" about their
political institutions. 19 The Supreme Court accepted the views of these schol-
ars when it gave constitutional endorsement to the right to know.
17. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211-12; In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 571.
18. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1211-12; In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 571.
19. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander Meiklejohn's position
that freedom of speech is a necessary corollary to the American system of self-government).
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1. Philosophical Underpinnings
Traditionally the public's interest in, and right to, information has emanated
from the First Amendment.2 Although the First Amendment draws its values
from various sources,21 the philosophical basis of the First Amendment that is
most relevant to access issues relates to the public's interest in self-govern-
ment. This line of thought is most often associated with Alexander
Meikelejohn.2" Meikelejohn argued that freedom of speech is a necessary co-
rollary to the American system of self-government. 8 He contended that citi-
zens control the country through their votes and if they do not have the proper
knowledge of government their votes will not be well executed.2 Although
Meikelejohn never specifically extended his argument to require access to gov-
ernment institutions, other commentators have argued that acquisition of in-
formation through access is a prerequisite for the public to act in their inter-
ests for self-government.25 Without access to information, important aspects of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press would be "eviscerated."2" To
achieve the ideals of self-government, the government must not only ensure
open channels of speech but also ensure access so that relevant information
can flow through those channels. 2'
2. The Supreme Court and the Public's Right to Know
The Supreme Court first recognized the public's right to know in Grosjean
v. American Press Co.28 In Grosjean, the Court struck down a Louisiana state
tax on newspapers, holding that the tax would have the effect of restricting the
public's access to information and knowledge.2 9 The Court based its holding
on the First Amendment's intended protection of "such free and general dis-
20. The relevant part of the text reads: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Popular themes for the First Amendment include the promotion of individual self-expres-
sion and self-realization, and the utility of free expression in promoting the search for knowledge
and "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas." See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 976
(1 th ed. 1985).
22. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT (1948) (arguing that governing must be done by the governed through their rights of
self-expression).
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id.
25. See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14-20
(1976) (arguing that the public must have all information available in order to exercise its sover-
eign rights over the government); Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right
To Know"?: Access To Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1987) (stating that the right to know derives from a citizen's right to partici-
pate in the democratic process).
26. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 48 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 25, at 1113 (warning that when citizens vote without full
information, the welfare of the nation is threatened).
28. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
29. Id. at 249.
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cussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people
for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 80 This theory was instru-
mental in later Court findings that citizens have a right to receive information
in terms of personal correspondence, 1 political" and religious88 material, com-
mercial information,8 pornography,83 and information and ideas generally. 6
However, the "right to acquire" information had not received as much atten-
tion from the Court until the 1980s, when the cases concerning judicial pro-
ceeding access were decided.
B. Basis for Public Access to Judicial Proceedings
Although Americans have attended criminal trials since colonial times, they
have never had an express right to do so. 87 Therefore, courts have the ability
to close certain proceedings to the public when they find it necessary.88 Courts
justify the closure by holding that public access would violate a defendant's
due process right to a fair trial.8" Courts reject arguments that the Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial can be exercised by the public as well as
the defendant. 0 Eventually, courts began to accept a First Amendment self-
government theory for a right of access."
30. Id. at 250.
31. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (invalidating a law that permitted prison
officials to censor prisoner's incoming mail).
32. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the United States, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a
law that allowed the Postal Service to detain mailings of "communist political propaganda").
33. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that the state could not prevent a
person from distributing religious literature on streets of company-owned town since the town was
freely accessible to the public); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (holding a law
banning solicitors from going house-to-house with religious announcements violative of the First
Amendment).
34. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (upholding the right of pharmacists to advertise the prices of prescription drugs).
35. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment protects
possession of obscene material).
36. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC "fairness
doctrine" that requires broadcasters to give fair coverage to both sides of public issues).
37. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-94 (1979) (holding that the United
States Constitution does not grant a third party the right of access to pretrial proceedings when
the parties agree to close the trial).
38. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing a murder conviction since preju-
dicial pretrial and trial publicity denied the defendant a due process right to a fair trial).
39. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing Gannett, 443 U.S. 368).
40. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379 (holding Sixth Amendment right to a public trial exists for the
benefit of a criminal defendant only, not for the public in general); see Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 848 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he specific guarantees of the Sixth Amend-
ment are personal to the accused .... ").
41. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text (discussing Richmond Newspapers v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)).
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1. Sixth Amendment Access Analysis
In the past fifteen years the Supreme Court has set the modern guidelines
for cases addressing public access to judicial proceedings. The first significant
case concerning public access to courts that discussed a First Amendment the-
ory was Gannett Co. v. DePasquale."' In Gannett, a New York criminal trial
court had granted the defendant's uncontested motion to close a pretrial sup-
pression hearing to the public.4 ' The Supreme Court upheld the order, stating
that the Constitution does not grant a third party an affirmative right of access
to pretrial proceedings when all parties agree to close the trial." The Court
reasoned that the defendant's due process right to a fair trial would be violated
by pretrial publicity caused by public access, 45 that the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial was for the defendant's benefit only and could not be
asserted by the public, 4  and that there was no historical basis for pretrial
access.
47
In Gannett, the Court paid close attention to the traditions of access to judi-
cial processes, a procedure they would repeat in other access cases. The Court
examined the history of public access to trials and pretrial proceedings. It ac-
knowledged that a common law rule of open trials had historically existed, but
found that traditionally pretrial hearings could be closed to the public pursu-
ant to a defendant's request. 48 It also applied an historical analysis to deter-
mine whether the drafters of the Constitution intended to give the public a
general right of access to trials under the Sixth Amendment. 4'9 The Court con-
cluded that there was no such intention.50
The majority opinion only examined the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial in making the access determination.5" The Court de-
clined to look to the First Amendment for a public right of access, holding
that the eventual release of the transcript of the proceeding rendered the issue
42. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
43. Id. at 376.
44. Id. at 378-94.
45. Id. at 378.
46. Id. at 379.
47. Id. at 389.
48. The Court examined the traditions of access to trials and pretrial proceedings both in the
United States and in England. Id. at 389-90. The English distinguished "preliminary or prefatory
stages of the proceedings," which could be closed to the public, from actual trials, which must
remain open to the public. Id. at 389 (quoting EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75
(6th ed. 1967)). The Court also examined the New York Code of Criminal Procedure published in
1850. This Code provided that pretrial proceedings could be closed to the public upon the defend-
ant's request. Id. at 390 (quoting COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, CODE OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, § 202 (Final Report 1850)).
49. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384-87. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
50. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384-91.
51. Id.
19921
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moot."
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, did address the First Amendment issue
that the majority refused to rule on, and was the only member of the Court to
support a limited right of access to judicial proceedings under the First
Amendment.5 3 Justice Powell reasoned that since the First Amendment pro-
tected the public's interest in "having accurate information concerning the op-
eration of its criminal justice system," he would recognize a qualified First
Amendment right of access to trials.5 4 However, he pointed out that a quali-
fied right, by definition, is not absolute, and must be balanced against compet-
ing interests. 5 Justice Powell then balanced the qualified right of access
against both the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial free from
publicity, and the government's interests in obtaining just convictions and
maintaining the confidentiality of its information and informants.56 Applying
this balance, he found the interests of the defendant and the government supe-
rior to the qualified right of access, and thus voted to affirm the closure
order. "
2. First Amendment Analysis: Preliminary Framework for Access to Trials
Justice Powell's concurrence in Gannett presaged the course that the Su-
preme Court would follow in future access cases. One year after Gannett, the
Court decided Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia," and the First Amendment
qualified right of access to courts was created. In Richmond Newspapers, the
Court reviewed a request by media petitioners for access to a murder trial
where the petitioners had been excluded pursuant to the defendant's uncon-
tested motion.5 ' Seven members of the Court agreed that the public deserves
some sort of access to the courts at trial stages. However, six separate concur-
rences were filed and thus a general framework for lower courts was not set
up.6" Chief Justice Burger's opinion stated that the First Amendment guaran-
teed a limited right of access to trials.6 In reaching this conclusion, the Chief
Justice emphasized the historical tradition of open access,62 relying on this
history of access as evidence that access is an "indispensable attribute of the
Anglo-American trial." 68 In finding an historical basis of access to trials, Chief
Justice Burger traced the traditions of court access in England from the Nor-
man invasion to the present, and examined how these traditions influenced the
52. Id. at 391-93.
53. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 397-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 400-02 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring).
58. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
59. Id. at 560.
60. Id. at 555.
61. Id. at 580.
62. Id. at 565-73.




Chief Justice Burger conceded that no part of the Constitution specifically
required open access to trials, but he found that many modern rights were not
specifically provided for in the Constitution.6" This finding of an implied right
within the First Amendment circumvented the reasoning from Gannett that
resisted finding an implied right within the Sixth Amendment." Chief Justice
Burger shifted the focus of his analysis from the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a public trial to the public's First Amendment right to know,
and found that access to trials fostered the freedom of speech, press, and as-
sembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment.6" Thus the Chief Jus-
tice reasoned that the existence of these "express" rights required the protec-
tion of the "implied" right of public access to trials. However, Chief Justice
Burger cautioned that the right of access is not absolute, so that an "overrid-
ing interest articulated in findings" would allow a closure order to stand.68
Chief Justice Burger indicated that a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment
right to a fair trial might on occasion constitute an "overriding" interest, but
that ordinarily, jury sequestration or other alternatives would diminish the ad-
verse effects publicity may have on a defendant's right to a fair trial.69
Rather than finding another implied right emanating from the First Amend-
ment as Chief Justice Burger did, Justice Brennan's concurrence concluded
that the First Amendment itself explicitly guaranteed a qualified right of ac-
cess to trials. 0 Justice Brennan argued that "the First Amendment embodies
more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange
for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and fostering
our republican system of self-government." ' 1 Justice Brennan's structural
model links the First Amendment to all forms of communication that are nec-
essary for a democracy to survive.72 Therefore, the structural aspects of the
First Amendment would include the right to receive or acquire information
64. Id. at 565-73.
65. Id. at 579-80. Chief Justice Burger further stated:
Notwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the Constitution rights
not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights
are implicit in enumerated guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of
privacy, the right to be presumed innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel,
appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.
Id.
66. The Gannett Court felt constrained by the framers' intent that the Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial could only be exercised by defendants, and not by the public itself. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 379, 384-87 (1979). The Richmond Newspapers Court did not feel re-
strained by the framers' intent. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579.
67. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578.
68. Id. at 581.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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since this type of communication better enables citizens to govern
themselves .7
To determine whether the qualified First Amendment right of access should
exist in a particular case, Justice Brennan foreshadowed later Court analysis
of access questions by evaluating both the historical traditions of access to
trials, as well as the functional advantages of access. 74 If a process had been
publicly accessible throughout history, and if access benefitted the process,
then a First Amendment qualified right of access exists .7 Justice Brennan jus-
tified the examination of historical standards for access cases by noting that
"the Constitution carries the gloss of history" and that "a tradition of accessi-
bility implies the favorable judgment of experience."17 6 In applying this two-
pronged standard to the case at hand, Justice Brennan found that traditionally
trials have been open, and that access is important to the broad purposes of
the trial process. Thus, Justice Brennan found a qualified right of access under
the First Amendment.77 When balancing the qualified right of access versus
other competing interests, Justice Brennan found no interest in the case com-
pelling enough to justify closure of the trial s.7
3. First Amendment Analysis: General Acceptance of a Qualified Right of
Access to Trials
Two years later, a majority of the Court finally accepted the First Amend-
ment theory of access. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court7 9 Justice
Brennan, speaking for the majority, struck down a Massachusetts law that
denied public access to any trial testimony of minors who are alleged victims
of sexual abuse.80 Globe was also significant for shedding light on what might
constitute an "overriding interest" that would outweigh the presumption of
access that the First Amendment guarantees if a qualified right of access is
found.81
In determining that the media had a qualified right of access to this pro-
ceeding, Justice Brennan relied on his reasoning in Richmond Newspapers
that the historical and functional aspects of access to this proceeding should be
examined.82 If the hearing was historically open to the public,83 and openness
73. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
75. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring).
78. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan discovered no compelling interest
to exist in this case, he speculated that a national security interest would probably overcome the
First Amendment concerns. Id. at 598 n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
80. Id. at 598.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 605. Justice Brennan argued that the history of access should be examined since "the
Constitution carries the gloss of history" and that logic dictates that if access contributes to the
function of a process then access should be permitted. Id. at 605-06.
R1 This case provided the first opportunity for the Court to disagree in its interpretation of
(Vol. 41:431
SEALED SEARCH WARRANTS
contributed to the hearing process,8" then a qualified right of access exists.
After finding a qualified right of access, the Court balanced that right ver-
sus the state's asserted interests." In this case the state's interest was in pro-
tecting the privacy of minors who were sexual abuse victims, and encouraging
confidentiality so that more victims of abuse would come forward to testify in
court. 6 The Court gave an indication of what might constitute a compelling
interest strong enough to overcome the First Amendment interests when it
balanced these various concerns. It found that a minor's privacy interest is
compelling." However, the interest must be particularized to the case at bar
and it cannot be speculative. 8 Here, the state failed to prove that the particu-
lar child involved in this case would suffer a privacy harm, and it failed to
prove convincingly that law enforcement would be enhanced with the clo-
sure.89 Therefore, the Court rescinded the sealing order.90
4. Extension of the Right of Access Outside the Traditional Trial Stages
The Court next examined access to a different aspect of the trial process,
voir dire. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1),91 the
press sought access to voir dire' in a defendant's criminal trial for the rape
history. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, accused Justice Brennan of ignoring "a long history
of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those against minors."
Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 605-06. Justice Brennan changed his original position on the functional analysis from
Richmond Newspapers to Globe. In Richmond Newspapers the contribution of access had to be
for the particular process itself while in Globe Justice Brennan concluded that the right of access
must play a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process or the government as a
whole. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 593-94 (1980) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Globe, 457 U.S. at 605-06. Significantly, this has led to confusion among lower courts on
how to apply the test--specifically, whether they should examine the effect on a particular process
or the judicial process as a whole. See Hayes, supra note 25, at 1134-35.
85. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606. After balancing the parties' interests, the Court rescinded the clo-
sure order, holding that the public's right of access was not outweighed by the state's interest in
shielding allegedly sexually abused children from the media spotlight, absent a particularized find-
ing that the minors would be harmed by the publicity. Id. at 610.
86. Id. at 607.
87. Id. The Court indicated that the state's law enforcement interest also might be compelling.
Id. at 609.
88. Id. at 608-09. Specifically, the Court would not allow a general closure law whenever child
victims are involved in a case. The Court demanded that the state prove the child involved in this
particular case would suffer an invasion of privacy to such an extent that it would cause emotional
trauma. Id. at 608. For the state's interest in law enforcement to be found compelling, the Court
required empirical proof that closure would enhance law enforcement. Here, it held that the state
was only speculating on potential benefits to law enforcement from closure orders. Id. at 609.
89. Id. at 609-10.
90. Id. at 611.
91. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
92. Actually, the press sought access to a transcript of the voir dire proceeding, but the Court
approached the access request as one to the voir dire proceeding itself, not the document emanat-
ing from it, when deciding the issue of whether a qualified right of access existed. See id. at 503.
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and murder of a teenage girl." The prosecution objected to public access to
the proceeding, fearing that press coverage of the process would hinder juror
candor and thus prevent a fair trial." The Supreme Court rejected the state's
claim for closure of voir dire." The Court cited the historical evidence of ac-
cess to juror questioning" and stressed the fairness of a public trial and the
appearance of fairness that an open trial provides.9 7 The Court reiterated that
the right of access is not absolute, but could be overcome by a showing of
higher values that are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.9 The Court did
not find a compelling interest present in this case. Significantly, it did note
that a juror's privacy interest might be compelling when a juror is asked to
reveal information that is embarrassing or could cause emotional trauma.99
This case is significant as it was the first time the Court protected access to a
proceeding not in the traditional trial stages.
5. The Two-Pronged Test of the First Amendment Right of Access
The next prominent case finally crystallized a definitive standard for analyz-
ing public access questions. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I1),' ° ° petitioner newspaper sought access to a transcript from a
forty-one day preliminary hearing in a sensational murder trial10 that had
been closed to the public." 2 The Supreme Court allowed access to the tran-
script in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger.'08 Although the media petitioners
in this case sought access to the preliminary hearing transcript, which is essen-
tially a judicial document, the Court looked beyond the document and treated
the access request as one to the preliminary hearing itself, rather than any
documents it might produce.' 04
The Press-Enterprise H Court firmly embraced the two-pronged test pro-
posed by Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers. In applying
this test, the Court first examined the historical basis of access and then ex-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 513.
96. Id. at 505-08.
97. Id. at 508-09.
98. Id. at 511.
99. Id. at 512. Justice Blackmun concurred in this decision, withholding complete support
because he was apprehensive of the Court's language concerning the privacy rights of jurors. Jus-
tice Blackmun cautioned that carving out a privacy right for potential jurors could cause havoc in
courtrooms as jurors might consistently refuse to answer questions, invoking their privacy rights.
Id. at 515 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
101. Id. at 3. Defendant was a nurse charged with murdering twelve patients by administering
to them massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. The Court took a similar approach in Press-Enterprise 1, where it treated an access
request to a voir dire transcript as an access request to voir dire itself. See supra note 92.
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amined the contribution that access would make to the function of the particu-
lar process in question."' 5 If a court finds that, historically, the process has
been accessible to the public, and that access would provide a positive contri-
bution to the process, then a qualified right of access exists.106 If a qualified
right of access is found, any argument in support of closure would have to pass
a strict scrutiny test. Closure must be essential in order to uphold higher val-
ues, and it must be narrowly tailored to serve those values.10 7 In applying the
two-pronged test here, the Court found that, historically, preliminary hearings
in California08 were open,109 and that the preliminary hearing would benefit
from access since it was often the most important or final step in the trial
process.110 Thus, a qualified right of access to preliminary hearings existed in
Press-Enterprise I. When applying the strict scrutiny standard to the inter-
ests asserted against the qualified right of access, the Court did not find any
state interest compelling enough to overcome the right of access.11'
Thus, under the current state of the law governing access to judicial pro-
ceedings, the two-pronged Press-Enterprise H standard is applied to proceed-
105. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 8. Note that the Court accepted Justice Brennan's analy-
sis from Richmond rather than Globe and limited the contribution analysis to the process itself
rather than society as a whole. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06
(1982); see also supra note 84 (discussing Justice Brennan's analysis).
106. Press-Enterprise I. 478 U.S. at 10-13.
107. Id. at 9-10. This strict scrutiny test was first advanced in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
108. There is some dispute as to whether this holding is limited to California hearings or
whether it opened up preliminary hearings throughout the United States. The Court referred to
preliminary hearings as conducted in California several times, so arguably the holding is limited
to California and states with preliminary hearing systems like California's. See Press-Enterprise
II, 478 U.S at 10-13. However, most lower courts have read the opinion to apply to all prelimi-
nary hearings. See Anne Albright, Note, Press-Enterprise, Inc. v. Superior Court of California for
the County of Riverside, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379, 401-02 (1986) (recommending that defense
attorneys in states with preliminary hearing procedures different from California's distinguish
Press-Enterprise If when seeking closure of their clients' preliminary hearings).
109. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10. As in Globe, there was also a disagreement on histori-
cal interpretation here. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, assailed the assertion by the majority that
pretrial hearings are traditionally open. Id. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, this decision is
inconsistent with Gannett where the majority relied on the lack of access to preliminary hearings
as a basis to deny the petitioner's requests. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 379, 389-90
(1979). Justice Stevens assumed that the majority was not limiting itself to preliminary hearings
in California. See Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 21-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12.
111. The Court indicated that a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial might
be compelling enough to outweigh a First Amendment right of access, but the defendant would
have to prove there was a "substantial probability" that his rights would be violated. Id. at 13.
Most case law indicates that there are many procedures to be employed by a trial judge to
ensure that the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights and the public's access rights can be
upheld concurrently. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), the Court suggested that trial
judges could take many steps to protect a defendant's rights short of closure, such as: jury seques-
tration; warnings to witnesses and jurors to avoid reading newspapers or watching television;
warnings to parties and attorneys not to encourage media sensationalism; delay of the trial until
publicity subsides; or relocation of the trial. Id. at 333-363.
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ings to determine whether a First Amendment qualified right of access exists.
The two-pronged test requires a finding of historical access as well as a finding
of a contribution to the process. The "history of access" prong requires courts
to trace English and American traditions to determine whether particular
hearings have been accessible in the past. The "contribution to function"
prong requires an examination of the advantages access might provide to a
particular proceeding as well as the benefits afforded to society in general. 112 If
the requirements for both prongs are met, then a qualified right of access ex-
ists. However, this right must be balanced with other compelling interests that
are narrowly tailored to serve the particular interest. In assessing what might
constitute a compelling interest, the Court has indicated that a defendant's
right to a fair trial, and possibly his privacy rights, would meet this
requirement.118
C. Basis for Public Access to Judicial Documents
The two-pronged test designed in Press-Enterprise II is tailored for determi-
nations of the right of access to certain judicial proceedings. However, it is
unclear whether the two-pronged test extends to determinations of the right of
access to judicial documents. 1 4 The Supreme Court, upon finding a qualified
right of access to the judicial proceedings, 1 has never directly addressed the
issue of whether the First Amendment guarantees the public a right of access
to judicial documents.1 In several of the judicial proceeding cases, the peti-
tioners actually sought access to documents, but the Court analyzed the issue
by looking at the process that produced the sought-after document.'1 7 Thus,
112. Note that the Court has altered its position on the requirement of a contribution to society
in general. See supra notes 84, 105 and accompanying text. Many lower courts look to both the
contribution to the function as well as the contribution to society in general.
113. See supra notes 99, 111 and accompanying text (discussing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. 1).
114. Most courts view search warrants as judicial documents. The Baltimore Sun court rea-
soned that the warrant is a judicial document because the judicial officer must file the warrant
and all papers connected with it with the clerk of the court. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d
60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g)); see also In re Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d
74, 77 (2d. Cir. 1990) ("Search warrants and the affidavits that precede their issuance are public
documents required by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to be filed with the
clerk of the issuing court.")
Rule 41(g) provides: "The federal magistrate before whom the warrant is returned shall attach
to the warrant a copy of the return, inventory and all other papers in connection therewith and
shall file them with the clerk of the district court for the district in which the property was
seized." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
115. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1980).
116. The Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1977), held that the First
Amendment did not guarantee access to judicial documents since there was no precedent for such
a reading of the First Amendment. Id. at 609. Commentators have suggested that a precedent
may exist for such a right after the holdings in Richmond Newspapers and Press-Enterprise II
where the Court found a qualified right of access to judicial proceedings. See MARC A. FRANKLIN
& DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 737-38 (4th ed. 1990) (reviewing court access cases).
117. For instance, in Press-Enterprise II petitioners sought access to a preliminary hearing
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the Supreme Court has never applied the two-pronged Press-Enterprise H test
to judicial documents themselves to determine whether a qualified right of ac-
cess to such documents exists.
However, the Court has recognized a distinct common law qualified right of
access to judicial documents. " 8 Courts have recognized this common law right
because public scrutiny of judicial documents enlightens public opinion, safe-
guards justice, and promotes confidence in the judiciary. " 9 The difference be-
tween a First Amendment right of access and one guaranteed by the common
law revolves on the strength of the presumption of access. A denial of access is
much more likely if the petitioner only has a common law right of access as
opposed to a right emanating from the First Amendment. A First Amendment
right of access can be denied only by proof of a "compelling governmental
interest" and proof that the closure order is "narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. 1 20 In contrast, although access to documents is presumed under the
common law, the access right may be overcome by a showing that counter-
vailing interests exist. This balancing of interests is "left to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts
and circumstances of a particular case.''
The Supreme Court found that the common law guarantees a right of ac-
cess to certain judicial documents in Nixon v. Warner Communications. 2' In
Nixon, the Court reviewed a request from the media to obtain copies of tapes
containing conversations between defendants involved in the Watergate scan-
dal.1 28 The tapes were played at a trial of one of the defendants and thus the
public had access to them. The media, however, sought the right to copy the
tapes and to sell them to the public. 24 The Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the tapes were judicial records and that the common law recognized a
right of access to all judicial records. 2 The Court then focused its analysis on
the scope of that right of access to determine whether it included a right for
transcript but the Court examined the preliminary hearing itself when determining whether access
is merited; and in Press-Enterprise 1, the petitioner sought access to a voir dire transcript but the
Court looked to the voir dire process itself when adjudicating access issues. See supra notes 92,
104 and accompanying text.
118. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 589. The Court has never spoken of a common law right of access
to trial, only to judicial records. See id. at 597-99.
119. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub. non?. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1977).
120. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
121. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
122. Id. at 589.
123. Id. at 591.
124. Id.
125. The Court held that it was "clear" that this right exists. Id. at 597. Other courts have
expanded on the purposes of the common law qualified right of access. See United States v.
Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Nixon v.
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that a common law right of access en-
lightens public opinion, safeguards justice, and promotes confidence in the judiciary).
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media outlets to copy and distribute judicial records." The Court established
the "sound discretion of the trial court" standard, where the presiding judge in
any access case is to weigh all relevant interests12 to determine whether ac-
cess to a particular judicial document is required."
Although the Nixon Court reasoned that only countervailing interests must
be shown in order to overcome a presumption of access, some lower courts
have applied stricter requirements." These courts have required a showing
that the competing interests are compelling so that proper deference is granted
to First Amendment concerns.1 3 The result is that these courts come very
close to providing protection as if the common law right was of constitutional
proportion. This expansion also coincided with what lower courts may perceive
as greater access potential following the decisions in Press-Enterprise II and
Richmond Newspapers."' Thus, under Nixon, the common law guarantees a
126. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.
127. The Court acknowledged that, in the past, courts granted access to judicial documents
without a showing of special need or interest. Id. at 597-98. Presumably, courts also could apply
this standard in the future. See William 0. Key, Jr., Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect
and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REv. 659, 660 (1982) (calling
for Supreme Court guidance on scope of common law right of access); Teri G. Rasmussen, Note,
Recognizing a Constitutional Right of Media Access to Evidentiary Recordings in Criminal Tri-
als, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 121, 123 (1983) (arguing for a right of access to documents introduced
into evidence at trial); Stuart Wilder, Comment, All Courts Should Be Open: The Public's Right
to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 337-39 (1979) (advocating in-
creased public access to pretrial proceedings and judicial documents).
128. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. The Court avoided applying the standard to the particular facts
involved in this case by disposing of the matter on different grounds. It held that the tapes were to
be managed by an archives administrator who could determine which segments of the tapes were
of historic value, and thus merited dissemination to the public. Id. at 603.
129. See Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11 th Cir. 1985) (requiring a
compelling government interest to seal settlement documents). See generally Sherry J. Hanley,
Note, Constitutional Law-Procedural and Substantive Prerequisites to Restricting First
Amendment Right of Access to Civil Hearings and Transcripts-Publicker Industries. Inc. v.
Cohen, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 159, 174-75 (1985) (reviewing various standards of weighing interests with
qualified common law right of access).
130. Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 713 P.2d 710, 718 (Wash. 1986) (Andersen, J., concur-
ring). The opinion argued that there should be a strong presumption of access to judicial records
that would be entitled to significant weight in the access determination, so that "only the most
compelling reasons can justify the nondisclosure of judicial records." Id. The opinion relied on
several circuit court of appeal holdings that granted a strong presumption of access to judicial
records that had been introduced as evidence in trials. Id. (citing Wilson v. American Motors
Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d
470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982); In re
Application of NBC (United States v. Criden), 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Applica-
tion of NBC (United States v. Jenrette), 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Application of
NBC (United States v. Meyers), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980)).
131. In Baltimore Sun, the Fourth Circuit applied a balancing scheme similar to the strict
scrutiny test the Supreme Court uses for a qualified First Amendment right of access to a com-
mon law qualified right of access. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989);
see also In re Application of CBS, Inc., 828 F.2d 958, 960 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting a media
petitioner permission to copy a videotaped deposition as the interests asserted for closure did not
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qualified right of access to all judicial documents, which may include search
warrants. However, the issue of whether the First Amendment guarantees a
qualified right of access to documents has not been reached after Richmond
Newspapers.
D. Search Warrants
Search warrants trace their roots to sixteenth-century England. During that
time, the British monarchs began to use what was known as a "general war-
rant" to search the property of persons living within their realm.18 The initia-
tion of these searches coincided with the invention of the printing press, and
can be seen as a reaction to the use of the printing press and the fear of
seditious or libelous publication. 188 Over the years much public dissatisfaction
brewed over the use of the general warrants. The warrants were seen as over-
broad and oppressive.3 4 The history of search warrants also can be traced to
colonial times in America. The British colonial rulers often used "writs of as-
sistance" to search citizens' belongings.185 These writs were issued by the En-
glish monarch and they lasted for a period of the issuing monarch's lifetime
plus six months. 18  The writs were used primarily as a tool to detect smug-
gling. Customs officers were empowered to search any areas believed to be
used for hiding smuggled goods. 8 ' Like the general warrants used in England,
the writs of assistance in America were detested because of their over-
breadth. 8 Customs officers were often issued blank writs to be filled in as
they gaw fit.189 This permitted the official to engage in searches with little or
no justification. 40
Although both the British citizens living in England and the American colo-
nists resented this governmental infringement on their property and belong-
ings, their dissatisfaction was expressed in vastly different ways. While the
English solved their problems through the courts, the Americans used the dis-
pleasure as a pretext for revolution.
rise to the level of "extraordinary" or "compelling circumstances").
132. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 25 (1937).
133. Id. at 24.
134. See infra text accompanying note 138 (noting that writs of assistance in America were
detested because of their overbreadth).
135. LASSON, supra note 132, at 28.
136. Robert J. Brantman & Scott K. Martinsen, Comment, Constitutional Law-Times-Mir-
ror Co. v. United States and a Qualified First Amendment Right of Public Access to Search
Warrant Proceedings and Supporting Affidavits, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 788 (1990) (citing
Charles A. Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class Consti-
tutional Right, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 271 (1950)).
137. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); LASSON, supra note 132, at 51;
POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW (1982).
138. Alan C. Schaefer, Comment, Aerial Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MAR-
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The English ridded themselves of general warrants in the seminal case of
Entick v. Carrington."' John Entick,'4 2 a searched individual, brought an ac-
tion against the government for damages resulting from trespass. A general
warrant had been issued by the King's secretary of state to search Entick's
property and to seize papers allegedly containing seditious libel.143 The court
upheld a judgment for Entick, finding that the government's incursion on En-
tick's property was unjustified."' Lord Camden's opinion held that searches
could be permitted only when the resulting invasion of private rights was out-
weighed "by some public law for the good of the whole." 1"' In this case the
general warrant exceeded the balance between private rights and public neces-
sity.1"6 Lord Camden further reasoned that since no established law permitted
general warrants, their use was proscribed by the law of trespass.1 7 Eventu-
ally, the British Parliament abolished the use of the warrants.1 4 6
The Americans found the writs of assistance a rallying point in their quest
for independence. Much public discourse and debate occurred over the issue of
warrants.' 9 The debate surrounding the warrants "was the first act of opposi-
tion to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain," and from it, "the child Indepen-
dence was born."' 0 After the American Revolution, several states incorpo-
rated a warrants clause into their state constitutions.' 5 ' These clauses were the
precursors to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
While the history of search warrants themselves is discernable, the history
of public access to review the warrants is much murkier. Clearly, the Fourth
Amendment does not explicitly call for a right of access to search warrants.152
141. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
142. Entick was involved in the publication of two anti-government papers, The Monitor and
The British Freeholder. Schaefer, supra note 138, at 459 n.21.
143. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 816-17.
144. Id. at 817-18.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 817.
147. Id.
148. LASSON, supra note 132, at 48-50.
149. The most famous debate on the legitimacy of writs of assistance took place in Boston in
1760 between James Otis and Jeremiah Gridley. This debate followed the death of King George
II. Because of his death, all writs expired six months later. Thus, the debate centered on whether
the writs should be reissued.
The debates also took place in the courtrooms of the colonies. Citizens were permitted to argue
their cause in open court. The various debates and public hearings culminated in Paxton's Case,
where the colonial courts determined that new writs would be issued. See Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); LAssoN, supra note 132, at 58-59; Brantman & Martinsen, supra note
136, at 788.
150. 10 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (1850).
151. Virginia established the first state constitutional predecessor to the Federal Constitution's
Fourth Amendment in the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776. See LAssoN, supra note 132, at 79
(citing 2 BENJAMIN P. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1909 (1877)). Prior to the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, every state except New Jersey adopted a warrants clause in its
state constitution. See LAssoN, supra note 132, at 79-80.
152. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
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However, the purpose of the amendment is to protect the public from the gov-
ernment's overaggressive use of power. The amendment imposes strict require-
ments for the issuance of a warrant in order to insure public protection from
this evil. Some sort of public oversight must have been contemplated in order
to insure that this alleged protection actually was being carried out.158
The search warrant procedure in American courts starts with the govern-
ment's application to a magistrate or judge for the warrant. Applications gen-
erally consist of affidavits supporting the claim of probable cause and an oath
by the applicant authenticating the application."' The search warrant will be
issued if there is probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of the
search is at a particular location, 55 and if the oath and affidavits themselves
are in order. 56 After issuance, the law enforcement authorities must conduct
the search within a statutorily prescribed time limit."" The warrant then must
be returned to the issuing judge and filed with the court.
The government has the ability to request that the executed search warrants
be filed under seal. Generally, courts freely grant sealing orders for search
warrants upon a showing by the government that it requires secrecy. 158 The
government is permitted to make its own determinations on whether an inves-
tigation requires secrecy and thus needs sealing orders. '5 Generally, courts
are highly deferential to the governmental determination of the need for
closure. 60
E. Public Access to Sealed Search Warrants
When courts examine access requests concerning sealed search warrants
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
153. See Brantman & Martinsen, supra note 136, at 790 (discussing how the public should be
able to review a court's determination of probable cause to prevent government abuse).
154. Courts are split on the issue of whether supplemental oral statements may be used to
prove probable cause. See Charles L. Cantrell, Search Warrants: A View of the Process, 14
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989).
155. See Stegald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981); Brinegan v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
The four permissible grounds for issuance of search warrants, in general, are for the pursuit of:
(1) stolen property; (2) property used to commit a felony; (3) property held with the intent to be
used to commit a felony; and (4) property that constitutes evidence that a felony was committed.
See Cantrell, supra note 154, at 4 n.8 (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1222 (West 1986)).
156. An affidavit will fail if the information in it finds its source in constitutional violations,
such as prior illegal searches, or if it is based on speculation and suspicion. See Cantrell, supra
note 154, at 28.
157. See id. at 68.
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they can take one of two approaches for determining whether a right of access
to the documents exists. They can look at the search warrants as judicial
records, thereby applying the Nixon common law qualified right of access to
them, and possibly even applying a First Amendment right of access.1"' Alter-
natively, courts can evaluate the request of access to a search warrant as a
request of access to a judicial proceeding that may have generated the warrant
or to which the warrant is integrally related.162 This latter approach would be
consistent with the method used by the Supreme Court in some access
cases.'
6 8
Search warrant access cases are also unique in that they pit very divergent
interests against one another. Thus, in any warrant access case the reviewing
court must balance the rights and concerns of the public, the government, and
the searched individual.
1. Interests that Are Asserted
Although either the common law or the First Amendment may allow a right
of access to a judicial proceeding or document, that right is only a qualified
right.6 The qualified right of access must be balanced against the various
interests that may weigh against disclosure. In the various cases analyzing the
qualified right of access to search warrants, courts have weighed the advan-
tages of public access against the harms of disclosure that may befall govern-
ment and individuals.
a. The government's interests
In almost every case involving access to search warrants, the government
has an interest in ensuring that law enforcement will not be thwarted.'65 The
government has an interest in the success of an ongoing investigation in which
the disputed search warrants and affidavits are used. Although the search war-
rant and affidavit may play only a small role in the investigation, they never-
theless could divulge much information. According to the government, access
to such documents could taint the investigation because the dissemination of
the information contained in the warrants or the affidavits could reveal the
scope and direction of the government's plans. 66 The sought-after documents
161. Recall that the Court has not ruled on the First Amendment right of access to judicial
records since the Richmond Newspapers decision guaranteed a qualified right of access, under the
First Amendment, to judicial proceedings. See supra notes 58-78 (discussing the Richmond News-
papers decision at length).
162. The courts in the search warrant access cases have employed the latter method, examining
search warrant access requests pursuant to access rulings on warrant proceedings, grand jury pro-
ceedings, and suppression hearings. See infra notes 214, 230, 236 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing Press-Enterprise I and Press-En-
terprise I1).
164. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
165. An interest in law enforcement may, of course, be an interest of the public also.
166. See In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574
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may also contain information that would motivate suspects to destroy evi-
dence, 167 to tamper with witnesses by coordinating testimony,16 to endanger
the government's informants,169 to threaten or intimidate reluctant wit-
nesses,170 or to flee the jurisdiction.171
b. The individual's interests
Individuals who are the focus of search warrants also have many interests.
The primary interest is privacy, an interest that has faced the Supreme Court
on more than one occasion in judicial proceeding access cases. 172 Public access
to sealed search warrants would let the public know that these individuals
were the focus of a governmental investigation. Likewise, although the individ-
uals remain uncharged, the public might perceive the government's suspicion
as guilt on the part of the suspect.17 8 Disclosure thus could seriously damage
the reputations and careers of suspects and place them in a "precarious posi-
tion as un-indicted co-conspirators."'"47 Additionally, since these persons are
private individuals, they may not have any forum in which to exonerate them-
selves from the smear of government suspicion.
175
Courts take differing approaches to weighing the importance of reputation
and privacy interests. Some courts hold that judicial documents can be sealed
if they imply that a person engaged in criminal misconduct.176 Other courts
(8th Cir. 1989).
167. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1989).
168. Id.
169. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989).
170. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1215.
171. Id.
172. In Press-Enterprise 1, the Court voiced concern over the privacy interest of the jurors
during voir dire. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984). In Gan-
nett the Court was concerned with the privacy interest of minors. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 369 (1979). In earlier cases the Court has held that individuals have a privacy interest
when they are subjects of governmental investigations. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops North-
west, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (denying access to grand jury transcripts); United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 n.2 (1958) (denying access to a grand jury transcript
for failure to "show cause" for disclosure). However, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), the Court ruled that a rape victim's privacy interest in keeping her name out of
the papers did not outweigh the presumption of openness when the names of rape victims were
printed on public judicial documents. Id. at 496-97.
173. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
174. Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 895 F.2d 460, 467 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990).
175. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
176. See Pulitzer Publishing, 895 F.2d at 464 (sealing search warrant affidavits that implied
criminal misconduct by an unindicted individual); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114
(3d Cir. 1985) (denying access to portion of bill of particulars containing names of unindicted
individuals because "it is virtually certain" that disclosure will inflict "serious injury" to the per-
sons, possibly threatening their careers); In re NBC, 653 F.2d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prevent-
ing petitioner from copying videotapes introduced into evidence containing references to objecting
third parties if those references expose the objecting individual to public humiliation and
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have required only that information causing "intensified pain" to an individual
be suppressed.?'7 These courts have held that a person has not suffered intensi-
fied pain even if the information in the documents is false or links the individ-
ual to criminal activities."7 8 Intensified pain is suffered only when the state-
ments or information disclosed is libelous or involves intimate conversation. 7 9
The Supreme Court itself has addressed a privacy interest with respect to
court access in various ways. In Gannett and Press-Enterprise , the Court
held that the respective privacy concerns of minors and jurors could be com-
pelling interests if the information disclosed by a judicial process embarrassed
the individual or caused emotional trauma. 80 But the Court has also dis-
counted privacy interests in other cases, such as when an embarrassing or
traumatizing fact is part of an official judicial record. 8 '
Since the search warrant access cases involved warrants executed on corpo-
rations as well as on individuals, either of these groups may claim privacy
interests. However, a corporation's privacy interest may be weaker than that
of a private individual. This is also true for individuals in their capacity as
employees of the searched corporations. 8 Courts are less willing to protect
corporate privacy or reputation interests, especially if the corporation has en-
gaged in potentially illegal activities.'88 Moreover, corporations relying on gov-
ernment contracts may have even less of a privacy interest. 84 A corporation's
degradation).
177. See United States v. Criden, 681 F,2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1982) (requiring that references
to innocent third parties in judicial documents must "inflict unnecessary and intensified pain" in
order to be suppressed, and that unflattering and even false references or speculation on impact of
negative publicity do not rise to the level of "intensified pain"); In re News World Comm., Inc.,
[1989] 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1001, 1003 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 12, 1989) (holding that an individ-
ual accused of being related in some way to a criminal investigation or exposed for having difficul-
ties at the workplace did not suffer injury to reputation or privacy interest that rose to level of
"intensified pain," but the requirement could be met with a showing of libelous statements or
recordings of bedroom or other intimate conversation).
178. Criden, 681 F.2d at 922; In re News World, [1989] 17 Media L. Rep (BNA) at 1004.
179. Criden, 681 F.2d at 922; In re News World, [1989] 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1003-04.
180. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979).
181. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (disclosure of a rape victim's
identity).
182. See infra notes 183-85 (explaining judicial treatment of the privacy interests of corpora-
tions and of corporate employees in their representative capacity).
183. See Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a company's reputation interest does not overcome the common law presumption of access to
judicial records (settlement documents)); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d
1165, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that corporations cannot shield mismanagement because of
harm to their reputations); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing a sealing
order of pretrial records since the records did not contain information on trade secrets but rather
contained evidence of corporate mismanagement and potentially illegal conduct), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983).
184. In re Search Warrant, [1989] 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29,
1989) (finding a right of access to sealed search warrants executed on government contractors
because they are properly subject to public scrutiny).
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employees may also have less of a reputation or privacy interest if the warrant
relates to actions taken on behalf of their corporation.185
c. The public's interest
The public's interest in access to courtrooms relates back to the underpin-
nings of the First Amendment, where it is argued that access can help facili-
tate self-government. 186 Access leads to unfettered, robust debate187 and helps
to determine how we vote. 88 In the search warrant access cases in particular
the public may have had a self-governing interest in that the search warrants
were sealed in furtherance of massive FBI investigations of the defense weap-
ons industry and the health care industry. 88 Since public funds financed the
government's investigation and made up a large share of the money flowing
into the defense and health care industries, the public may have had an inter-
est in seeing what came of its tax dollars. 8 "
Additionally, access serves as a check on the judiciary and the prosecution.
This was a major point of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Gannett where he
wrote:
[Our nation's] accepted practice of providing open trials in both federal and
state courts has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt
to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that
every criminal is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.'98 .
185. In other contexts, employees forego certain rights if those rights must be asserted in con-
junction with their roles as employees. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that employees of a corporation cannot claim a Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination when asked to produce documents belonging to the corporation). Contra In re
Grand Jury Matter, 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that the custodian of records for a
corporation cannot be compelled to authenticate the records if he or she invokes the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination).
186. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing the work of Alexander
Meiklejohn, who supports this position).
187. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1978) (citing New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
188. Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 637 P.2d 966, 969 (Wash. 1981).
189. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1989).
190. See In re Petroleum Product Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34 (C.D. Cal. 1984). In this case, the
attorneys general of several states sued a group of oil companies, accusing them of driving inde-
pendent gasoline dealers out of business. The court held that the public deserved access to pretrial
documents since millions of dollars were affected if the charges of fraud were true, and if the
charges were false the public deserved to hear about the money wasted on the intense investiga-
tion. Id. at 39; see also Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
interest of citizens in penal administration can be outweighed only by a compelling governmental
interest).
191. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 412 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)). Justice Blackmun also relied heavily on the writings of
Jeremy Bentham, who believed that publicity was "the most effectual safeguard of testimony, and
of the decisions depending on it; it is the soul of justice; it ought to be extended to every part of
the procedure, and to all causes." Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM,
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Court access cases have explored numerous other reasons why general ac-
cess is necessary. Among the recognized interests is that of the public in re-
ceiving accurate information on the criminal justice system19 and in having
the appearance of justice, which in turn would create a significant therapeutic
value to citizens. 9 Access to courts can also have a positive educational effect
on the public: "[N]ot only is the respect for the law increased and intelligent
acquaintance acquired with the methods of government but a strong confi-
dence in judicial remedies is secure which could never be inspired by a system
of secrecy." 19'
While the public may have an abstract interest in free speech and its effects
on democratic government, the public also has an interest in effective govern-
mental law enforcement. 19 Additionally, the public does not necessarily want
the press to abuse access rights by using the information they receive to "grat-
ify spite and promote public scandal."' 196
2. Search Warrant Access
The federal circuit courts that have recently reviewed requests for access to
sealed search warrants have decided whether a qualified right of access to
search warrants is grounded in the First Amendment or the common law. The
courts have approached these two access issues in various ways. The Eighth
Circuit has held that there exists both a common law and First Amendment
A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 67 (1825)). This interest of a check on the judiciary and the
prosecution was a rationale for a qualified right of access to search warrants in In re Search
Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988). This interest
also was asserted by the Nixon Court as justifying deference towards access to judicial documents.
Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
192. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 412.
193. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1978). The Court noted:
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgement, long
before there were behavioral scientists, that public trials had significant community
therapeutic value. Even without such experts to frame the concept in words, people
sensed from experience and observation that, especially in the administration of crimi-
nal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have the support derived from
public acceptance of both the process and its results. When a shocking crime occurs, a
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter the open
processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion. Without an awareness that society's re-
sponses to criminal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and
protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful "self-
help" as indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on our
frontiers.
id.
194. Id. at 572 (citing 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 438 (James H. Chadbourn
ed., 1976)).
195. See Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989).
196. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (citing In re Caswell, 29 A.
259 (R.I. 1893)).
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right of access to search warrants.19 Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit has ex-
pressly disagreed with the Eighth Circuit, holding that no First Amendment or
common law right of access to search warrants exists.1" Finally, the Fourth
Circuit has reached a middle ground between the other two courts, holding
that the common law grants a right of access, but that the First Amendment
does not.1"9 The three federal circuits are in accord with how to treat the
search warrants with respect to the Nixon judicial-document access cases.
After search warrants are executed and filed with the issuing court they
become judicial documents. 00 However, none of the courts has analyzed the
warrants as independent judicial documents, consistent with the Nixon line of
cases. Instead, the courts have examined warrants as integrated parts of the
proceedings that they relate to, following the method of analysis employed in
the earlier media access cases. 01 The Eighth Circuit has established the right
of access by examining the history of access to suppression hearings.202 Con-
versely, both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits have rejected the examination of
suppression hearing access and instead look to the history of access to warrant
proceedings.208
a. The First Amendment approach
Media petitioners have asserted a First Amendment right of access to
search warrants that would force the government to prove a compelling inter-
est justifying closure. However, the argument for First Amendment access has
been denied by several courts.
The first major case on access to sealed search warrants in the federal cir-
cuit courts was In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of
Gunn.204 In In re Gunn, an Eighth Circuit case, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI") was conducting an ongoing investigation of corruption and
fraud in the Defense Department and the defense weapons industry (Opera-
tion Ill Wind).20 5 During the course of the nationwide investigation, the FBI
applied for, and received, search warrants from the Eastern District of Mis-
197. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 571
(8th Cir. 1988).
198. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217.
199. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1989).
200. Id.
201. See supra note 117 (discussing Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise I1).
202. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573
(8th Cir. 1988). "Pre-trial suppression hearings, and other kinds of non-trial proceedings in crimi-
nal and civil cases, have been held to be subject to the First Amendment right of public
access .. " Id.
203. See. e.g., Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 63-64; Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d
1210, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
204. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 570. For other commentary on Operation Ill Wind and the resulting adjudication,
see Jeffrey L. Levy, Note, An Ill Wind Blows: Restricting the Public's Right to Search Warrant
Affidavits, 74 MINN. L. REV. 661 (1990).
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souri to search the offices of the McDonnel Douglass Corporation. 0" In apply-
ing for these search warrants, the FBI had attached affidavits and other exhib-
its to establish probable cause.20 7 The search warrants were executed and
returned to the district court, where they were placed under seal pursuant to
the government's request.20 8 Appellant, Pulitzer Publishing Company, sought
access to the search warrants and the accompanying information.20 9 At the
time that appellant sought the information, Operation Ill Wind was ongoing
and the government had not yet indicted anyone. 210 The district court ruled
that the documents were to remain sealed for at least thirty days and an expe-
dited appeal took place. 211
The Eighth Circuit found both a First Amendment qualified right of access
and a common law qualified right of access to the documents. 212 The three
judges on the panel issued separate opinions. Judge McMillian, in finding a
First Amendment qualified right of access, applied the two-pronged Press-En-
terprise II standard, where a First Amendment qualified right of access exists
if there is a history of access and the access will contribute to the government
process .2 1  He found that an historical basis for public access to search war-
rants exists since suppression hearings-a judicial function to which the war-
rants are integral-are considered accessible. 214 Judge McMillian also found a
contribution to the function of the process since access would increase the pub-
lic's understanding of the search warrant process and may curb prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct. 1 Because a qualified First Amendment right of ac-
cess existed, Judge McMillian proceeded to weigh the competing interests to
access to determine whether the presumption of access to the warrants could
be overcome.216 He ultimately denied access to the media because the govern-
ment had satisfied the requirements of strict scrutiny.217 Judge McMillian
held that the government had an important interest in ensuring the success of
206. In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 570.





212. Id. at 573.
213. Id. The precedential value of Judge McMillian's opinion is unclear. Judge McMillian and
Judge Bowman reached the same conclusion-that there was no right of access to the search
warrants. However, Judge McMillian, unlike Judge Bowman, considered the possibility of a quali-
fied First Amendment right of access.
214. Id. The court recited the history of suppression hearings, since the warrants are the center
of those hearings at a later stage. The judge did not indicate why this approach was preferable to
examining the history of the warrants themselves. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 574. Once a First Amendment qualified right of access exists, a presumption of
access to a particular process can be overcome only by a showing of compelling interests, narrowly
tailored to serve those interests. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984).
217. In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574. The strict scrutiny test would permit closure if it "is essential
to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to that interest." Id.
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the ongoing investigation and that there was no less restrictive means to deal
with the access request because every line of the affidavit was crucial. 18
Judge Bowman, writing separately, declined to join Judge McMillian in rec-
ognizing a qualified right of access under the First Amendment, leaving "the
First Amendment question to another day."' 1 Judge Bowman stated that even
if, hypothetically, the First Amendment right existed, access would still be
denied since the government justification for sealing was "abundantly
clear." I" 0 The government had a strong interest in not compromising its inves-
tigation of the alleged criminal activities."'
Judge Heaney, also writing separately, agreed with Judge McMillian that
both a First Amendment and common law right of access to the documents
existed. Judge Heaney adopted Judge McMillian's reasoning on the First
Amendment issue that access was mandated both historically and function-
ally."' After determining that this right of access existed, Judge Heaney dis-
agreed with Judges McMillian and Bowman on the disposition of the case.
Judge Heaney argued that the government had not shown a compelling inter-
est to overcome the presumption of access."' Judge Heaney maintained that
since the investigation was drawing to a close and because extensive media
coverage of the investigation had already taken place, any targets of the probe
must be cognizant of the investigation, and thus the government's interest in
law enforcement was minimal." 4 Further, he reasoned that since this alleged
fraud involved hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars, the public was "enti-
tled to know the full details of the procurement fraud as soon as possible in
order to intelligently act on the matter.""'2 5
The next major case on search warrant access also stemmed from Operation
Ill Wind. The Ninth Circuit, in Times Mirror Co. v. United States,26 dealt
with a media outlet's request to unseal certain search warrants and accompa-
nying affidavits that the government had sealed after the search of an arms
contractor's facility." 7 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Eighth Circuit
and found no First Amendment right of access to search warrants. 28 The
court in Times Mirror also applied the Press-Enterprise H test but reached
218. Id.
219. Id. at 576 (Bowman, J., concurring). Judge Bowman argued that even if he were to find
that the petitioners had a First Amendment qualified right of access to the warrants, the closure
order would still stand because the government had a compelling interest that outweighed the
qualified right of access. He would only determine whether the First Amendment right of access
existed if the petitioners had a reasonable chance of gaining disclosure. Id. (Bowman, J.,
concurring).
220. Id. at 575 (Bowman, J., concurring).
221. Id. (Bowman, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
227. Id. at 1211-12.
228. Id. at 1217.
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the opposite conclusion; the court determined that there was no tradition of
access to search warrants or to warrant proceedings and that access would
provide no positive contribution to the process." In examining the traditions
of access and in subsequently finding that no tradition of access existed here,
the court's approach differed from that of the In re Gunn court because it
treated the request for the search warrants as a request to access warrant
issuing proceedings.' 80 Thus, the court traced the historical roots of access to
warrant proceedings rather than suppression hearings or search warrants
themselves. 81 The court did not explain why it was examining the history of
warrant proceedings rather than the historical basis of access to suppression
hearings or to the search warrants themselves, or why that approach was dis-
positive of the right of access to the warrants. The court's finding that public
access conferred no positive contribution to the warrant process turned on the
pronouncement that access would impede government investigations and
would violate the privacy interest of an individual who had not been charged
with any crime. 2
The Fourth Circuit joined the debate in 1989 in Baltimore Sun Co. v.
Goetz."' In Baltimore Sun, the court reviewed a district court ruling that had
sealed search warrants and affidavits from an FBI investigation of fraud and
organized crime in the health insurance industry. 84 The Baltimore Sun court
applied the Press-Enterprise H test and also treated the access request to the
search warrants as an access request to a warrant issuing proceeding, similar
to the method used by the Times Mirror court . 5 Thus it examined the histor-
ical basis for access to warrant proceedings, ignoring the traditions of access to
suppression hearings or to the warrants themselves.2 6 The court determined
that no First Amendment right of access to the warrants existed since warrant
proceedings had traditionally been closed to the public." 7 Because the court
229. Id. at 1215-16.
230. Id. at 1215.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1216. The court stated that reports linking an individual to a governmental investi-
gation of criminal activities would cause serious injury to that person. Id. The court also found
that the government probe must remain secret so that the targets of the probe will not be tipped
off. Id. at 1215.
233. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989)
234. Id. at 62.
235. Id. at 63-64.
236. Id. The Times Mirror court also examined the history of access to warrant proceedings
rather than to suppression hearings or the warrants themselves, also failing to give a reason for its
choice of jurisprudence regarding that particular hearing as being dispositive of access decisions
regarding the warrants themselves. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218. For a general discussion of
the court's analysis in Times Mirror, see supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
237. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989). In ruling that warrant
proceedings are closed to the public, the Baltimore Sun court relied on Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 169 (1978) and United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972),
where the Supreme Court had ruled that warrant issuing proceedings were not public proceedings
because access could tip off individuals who were the focus of potential searches. Baltimore Sun,
886 F.2d at 64.
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found the First Amendment right of access lacking, it did not have to balance
the various interests involved. The court did note, however, that governmental
law enforcement interests were compelling at the warrant proceeding stage.2 38
The most recent case on search warrant affidavits is the 1990 opinion from
the Eighth Circuit in Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publishing
Co.239 The case was a remnant of In re Gunn with the same cast of characters
as before.2 10 However, at the point at which this case arose, the government
had withdrawn its assertion of an interest in keeping the search warrant infor-
mation sealed and only the searched individuals sought to seal the docu-
ments.2 41 Here, the court reiterated the First Amendment and common law
rights of access that it had recognized in In re Gunn, and then sought to bal-
ance that presumption of access versus competing interests .24  Balancing the
public's right of access against only the individual's privacy interest, the court
still found the individual's privacy interest compelling enough to overcome the
presumption of access. 48 The court specifically held that an unproven implica-
tion that an individual was involved in criminal activity is damaging enough to
a person's reputation to constitute a compelling interest justifying closure over
a qualified First Amendment right of access.
244
b. Common law approach
In three of the four search warrant access cases addressed, the courts also
engaged in discussion concerning a common law right of access to search war-
rants as judicial documents pursuant to Nixon v. Warner Communications.24
The courts also reached various conclusions concerning this right of access.
In In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 4"
where a three judge panel of the Eighth Circuit reviewed access requests to
sealed search warrants from an arms procurement fraud investigation, all
three judges had different approaches to the common law access issue. Judge
McMillian failed to reach the common law issue since he found that the First
Amendment guaranteed a qualified right of access. Presumably, he felt that
the First Amendment right of access was stronger, making it unnecessary to
go further. Judges Bowman and Heaney did find a qualified common law right
of access, but their interpretation of the strength of this right varied im-
mensely. Judge Bowman found that the common law qualified right of access
to documents was "well established. 2 47 The decision of whether access in a
238. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 64.
239. 895 F.2d 460 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990).
240. Id. at 463.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 462, 466.
243. Id. at 466.
244. Id.
245. 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1977).
246. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1989).
247. Id. at 576 (Bowman, J., concurring) (citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S.
19921 459
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particular case should be granted, however, should be done by a balancing of
interests, left to the sound discretion of the trial judge." 8 Alternatively, Judge
Heaney argued that the common law right of access should be as strong as a
First Amendment right of access, so that access could be denied only with a
showing of a compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.24 9 Judge Heaney disagreed with Judge Bowman's interpre-
tation that all interests should be balanced evenly. Judge Heaney would grant
much greater deference to public access concerns.2 0
In Times Mirror, another arms procurement fraud case, the Ninth Circuit,
after rejecting a First Amendment right of access, also rejected a common law
right of access to the search warrants. The court argued that the common law
right of access delineated in Nixon was an "alleged" right of access.2 51 The
court preferred to rely on other Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the
Nixon qualified right of access did not extend to all documents.2 5 2 Thus, when
applying the Ninth Circuit version of Nixon, the court required that parties
seeking access to judicial documents prove "a history of access" to the docu-
ment, and "an important public need justifying access."" 2 Under the Ninth
Circuit formulation, the burden was on the petitioner to prove a common law
right of access to judicial records. This contrasts with both frameworks set out
by the divided court in In re Gunn, where a presumptive common law right of
access existed, and the party opposing access had to prove either compelling or
outweighing interests to justify closure. In Times Mirror, the media petition-
ers failed to prove a tradition of access to search warrants, as warrant issuing
proceedings have traditionally been closed to the public. 4 The parties seeking
access also failed to show an important public need for access because access
would hinder governmental law-enforcement efforts.2 5 5 Thus, the common law
589, 597 (1978)).
248. Id. (Bowman, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Heaney would
have applied the strict scrutiny standard of Press-Enterprise II to a common-law qualified right of
access. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Judges Bowman and McMillian held that the governmental interests outweighed the First
Amendment interests, thus ultimately denying access. Judge Heaney would have permitted access
under his version of the balancing test. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1989).
252. The Times Mirror court cited In re Special Grand Jury, 674 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1982),
which "established one limitation on the common law right of access described in [Nixon v.]
Warner Communications-there is no right of access to documents which have traditionally been
kept secret for important policy reasons." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219. In In re Special
Grand Jury, the court had denied a common law right of access to grand jury documents. 674
F.2d at 781.
The Times Mirror court also cited Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d
1143 (9th Cir. 1983). The court read Associated Press to hold that Nixon was to be interpreted
as not extending access to "all pretrial documents." Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219.
253. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219.
254. Id. at 1215-16.
255. Id. at 1219 ("While we went on to hold that the public had a first amendment right of
access to most pretrial proceedings and documents, we did not suggest that the common law right
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right of access was rejected.
The Baltimore Sun court split on the access issues. The Fourth Circuit re-
jected a First Amendment right of access, but it did find a common law right
of access. 56 The court relied on Nixon, which it understood to guarantee a
common law right of access to all judicial documents. 25 7 This reading of
Nixon contrasts with the Times Mirror interpretation, where it was held that
the Nixon right of access was limited only to certain documents that have
historically been accessible and whose access benefits the public. 258 The Balti-
more Sun court found that search warrants are judicial documents as defined
by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and found, therefore, that
Nixon grants the public a qualified right of access to them. 5" It applied the
Nixon principle that determination of access pursuant to a qualified common
law right of access to judicial documents is left to the "sound discretion" of
the judge. 2 0 The court held that when judges exercise their discretion, they
should grant a high presumption of access, denying access only when sealing is
"essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.' 261 The Baltimore Sun approach to the evaluation of the divergent inter-
ests is identical to the test proposed by Judge Heaney in his opinion in In re
Gunn. 2  Judge Heaney also called for a common law right of access that
would be analyzed under a strict scrutiny test.2"  The Baltimore Sun court
then vacated the district court's approval of the sealing order, holding that the
findings that the affidavits and warrants should be sealed were not specific
enough.2 '
A review of the methods various circuits have implemented in assessing
search warrant access questions reveals that three distinct approaches exist.
First, the Eighth Circuit in In re Gunn and in Certain Interested Individuals
of access extended to all pretrial documents.").
256. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989).
257. Id.
258. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219.
259. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65. Search warrants are routinely filed with the clerk of the
court pursuant to Rule 41(g), and are therefore considered judicial documents. After filing, they
are available for use in the subsequent trial if their "sufficiency is questioned." Id. at 64; see supra
note 114 (setting forth the text of Rule 41(g)).
260. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 64.
261. Id. at 65-66 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
Thus, the Baltimore Sun court applied the presumption of access that exists for the First Amend-
ment qualified right of access to a common law right of access, thereby making the two rights
indistinguishable. The court may have been influenced by the perception that accessibility should
increase after the Richmond Newspapers line of cases was decided. See supra note 116 and ac-
companying text.
262. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 579
(8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 66. The district court had concluded that the search warrant
should be sealed because the public interest in having successful FBI investigations outweighed
the public's interest in access. However, this ruling was based on conclusory assertions and the
appellate court required specific findings of the public's interest in law enforcement. Id.
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found a First Amendment qualified right of access as well as a common law
right of access. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit in Times Mirror rejected both
of these approaches and held that no right of access exists. Finally, the Fourth
Circuit in Baltimore Sun apparently reached a middle ground since it denied
a First Amendment right of access, but found that right assured under the
common law. However, the Fourth Circuit's approach was similar to the
Eighth Circuit's analysis since both courts required that any interest compet-
ing against the qualified right of access be compelling and narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. Once the courts found a qualified right of access, they en-
gaged in a balancing analysis when privacy interests and law enforcement in-
terests were found to be compelling.
II. ANALYSIS
Courts evaluating challenges to sealing orders preventing access to search
warrants must take two steps in their review. First, the courts must determine
whether a qualified First Amendment or common law right of access exists.
Second, if a qualified right of access is found, the court must balance that
right against other competing interests such as the government's interest in
law enforcement or an individual's interest in privacy.
In this section, the Comment will recommend how courts should implement
the two steps used in access review. As applied now, both steps are inadequate.
The two-pronged Press-Enterprise II standard, the current methodology em-
ployed by the circuit courts for determining whether access rights exist, is in-
adequate because it overemphasizes the role of history in search warrant ac-
cess questions. The overemphasis on historical standards of access precludes
the access potential that is consistent with modern expectations. Secondly, the
balancing-of-interests standards used by courts that have found a qualified
right of access are inadequate because they overemphasize the importance of
governmental and individual interests at the cost of society's greater interest in
openness.
A. Methodology: Finding a Suitable Test for Determining Access Rights
to Search Warrant Materials-The Press-Enterprise II Test is
Inappropriate
The methodology used by the search warrant access courts for determining
whether a right of access to search warrants exists is an application of the
Press Enterprise II test. The test, however, is inappropriate for determining
access to judicial documents such as search warrants that are not integrally
related to particular judicial processes. The test is also flawed in that it places
an inordinate amount of emphasis on historical traditions, rather than the real-
ities of modern life. A balancing scheme is the best method for determining
whether the public deserves access to sealed search warrants.
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1. Focus on Search Warrants
The courts in the search warrant access cases examined the public's right of
access to search warrants under the PressEnterprise I standard. Under that
standard, the historical basis of the proceeding and the contribution to the
function are weighed in a complementary fashion.26 5 When applying the "tra-
ditions of access" prong to the disputed warrants, the courts sought to examine
the traditions of access to judicial proceedings that were related to the search
warrants, rather than examining the traditions of access to the search war-
rants themselves. "6 The courts chose to determine accessibility to warrants by
examining a proceeding integral to the warrant. In doing so, they had to first
decide which proceeding was, in fact, most integral to the warrants. The
courts, however, had different interpretations of which hearings the post-exe-
cution, pre-indictment search warrants best related to. Consequently, in an
effort to determine whether the public has a right of access to these search
warrants, the courts explored the history of access to suppression hearings
(where determinations of admissibility of evidence obtained through warrants
take place),26 7 warrant proceedings (where warrants are issued by magistrates
or judges),26 8 and grand jury sessions (where information obtained by a war-
rant may be introduced to obtain an indictment).2 9 Clearly, confusion exists
as to which judicial proceeding a post-execution, pre-indictment search war-
rant best relates. This disorder underlies the fact that there is no proceeding to
which the warrants should be considered integral, and therefore the warrants
should be examined as separate judicial documents.
Both the Baltimore Sun and the Times Mirror courts held that, since the
search warrants were issued originally from warrant proceedings, any access
requests to warrants should be treated as an access request to warrant pro-
ceedings.2 70 However, the finding of a correlation between the warrants and
the warrant proceeding is faulty since there is a fundamental difference be-
tween search warrants at the warrant proceeding stage and search warrants at
the post-execution stage. At the warrant proceeding, the state's interest in se-
crecy is much more significant since at that point the individual to be searched
265. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
266. See In re Gunn, 855 F.2d 569 (examining history of access to suppression hearings);
Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989) (examining history of access to
warrant proceedings); Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d 60 (same).
The courts apparently decided to follow the Supreme Court's approach. See Press-Enterprise
II, 478 U.S. at 10-13 (finding a right to a preliminary hearing transcript by examining the history
of access to the proceedings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464
U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (finding a right of access to a voir dire proceeding transcript based on a
tradition of access to the hearing itself); see also supra note 117 (discussing Press-Enterprise I
and Press-Enterprise I1).
267. In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573.
268. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 64; Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214.
269. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214.
270. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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could be tipped off,' and the privacy interest of the individual is greater since
not even a probable cause standard of suspicion has been met by the govern-
ment prior to the warrant proceeding. It is logical that public access to war-
rant issuance proceedings would be disadvantageous. However, in the search
warrant access cases, the public sought access to the warrants after they were
already executed. Thus, the disadvantages present at the warrant issuance pro-
ceeding stage no longer existed.
The Eighth Circuit in In re Gunn and Certain Interested Individuals also
failed to examine a tradition of access to search warrants themselves, but in-
spected the traditions of access to suppression hearings when finding a quali-
fied right of access.27 The finding of a relationship between the search war-
rants themselves and the suppression hearing is also faulty as differences exist
in warrants at the post-execution, pre-indictment stage and the suppression
stage of a trial. At the suppression stage, the person has already been indicted
and thus has lost some privacy interests, 78 and the government's investigation
is already over for all intents and purposes so that their interest in closure is
diminished. Therefore, analyzing rights of access to suppression hearings pro-
vides too much potential access to a search warrant at the pre-indictment
stage.
The language of the two-pronged test indicates that the Supreme Court as-
sumed that any access questions should revolve around some sort of hearing or
pretrial process, and indeed every Supreme Court access case has revolved
around a particular hearing. 7 4 However, the test does not fit for documents,
such as search warrants in pre-indictment, post-execution stages, that are not
integral to any particular proceeding. The lower courts' reviews of the search
warrant access cases are flawed since the courts rely on the two-pronged test
for their analyses, and seek to analogize search warrants from a post-execu-
tion, pre-indictment stage to hearings that have been recognized as accessible
or inaccessible. The courts find certain court proceedings, such as grand jury
sessions or suppression hearings, which have been determined through prece-
dent to be accessible or inaccessible, and analogize post-arrest, pre-indictment
warrants to the warrants involved in those proceedings. The courts analogize
these various types of warrants by looking for similarities in their use and
application. When a document lacks an integral relationship to any proceed-
ing, then that document's accessibility should be determined by an examina-
271. In the search warrant cases discussed above, the government raised the issue of having
persons other than the searched individual tipped off about the investigation. In re Gunn, 855 F.2d
at 574.
272. See id. at 573; Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. 895 F.2d 460, 462
(8th Cir.) cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 214 (1990).
273. See In re Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that after the defendant
has entered a plea agreement, his privacy interest in keeping search warrants sealed is dimin-
ished); In re Gunn, 855 F.2d at 573 (noting that suppression hearings traditionally are open be-
cause they are an integral part of the criminal trial and suppression issues often determine the
outcome of criminal prosecutions).
274. See supra note 117 (discussing Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II).
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tion of that document alone. The analogies that the various circuits draw be-
tween search warrants themselves and the various stages of criminal
prosecutions that the warrants are associated with are not compatible with the
post-execution, pre-indictment stage of these warrants. Therefore, the search
warrants should be examined for what they truly are: judicial documents.
2. The Two-Pronged Test Is Flawed: Overreliance on History
If courts were to apply the two-pronged test to search warrants themselves,
rather than to certain judicial proceedings, they would face a difficult task.
Examining the historical basis of access to the search warrant itself poses
many problems.27 5 Public access to search warrants prior to the initiation of a
criminal proceeding was simply not addressed in the historical development of
the warrant requirement, and no uniform policy on access can be gleaned from
the literature on the topic.2 76 Due to the lack of an historical background on
search-warrant access, any access determination test employing a history-of-
access requirement would automatically deny access to these warrants. Fur-
thermore, the history-of-access requirement inadequately deals with modern
problems and is of dubious worth. The importance of ensuring access compels
the development of an access determination test that is not dependent upon
history.
The Press-Enterprise II history-of-access requirement is suspect for several
reasons. A review of the application of the requirement by the courts shows an
inconsistency concerning how history should be viewed. The reliance on history
fails to reflect changes in our society as well as in the court system itself. In
addition, basing access determinations on traditions in England and colonial
America is unacceptable, as those traditions are significantly different from
the expectations of American society today.
a. Inconsistent application
In the judicial proceeding access cases, the Supreme Court has applied its
historical analysis inconsistently, varying the degree that history is to be em-
phasized, or disregarding prior Court determinations of historical access
rights. In Globe the Court de-emphasized the historical role of access, ignoring
evidence of a lack of access to trials involving sexual abuse of minors, when it
held that the media could attend those trials.177 In Press-Enterprise II, the
275. The difficulty in tracing the traditions of access to search warrants may have been the
reason the courts in the search warrant access cases turned to the history of warrant proceedings
and suppression hearings, where the history is clearer. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying
text.
276. Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1516-17 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citing Charles A. Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 266 (1950) (reviewing the historical basis of the Fourth
Amendment)). See generally Brantman & Martinsen, supra note 136, at 788-92 (criticizing the
historical prong of the two-pronged test).
277. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 614 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
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Court blatantly disregarded its holding in Gannett, decided only a few years
earlier, where it denied access to pretrial proceedings, and held that a tradition
of access to pretrial proceedings did, in fact, exist .1 8 Experience with other
legal concepts, such as habeas corpus, has proven that reliance on historical
standards when the historical record is barren leads to inconsistent application
by the courts.2 7 9 Courts and commentators have rejected the use of historical
analysis in fashioning modern legal rules in areas such as Seventh Amendment
law280 and the Establishment Clause 281 because of the confusion that would
result from an inaccurate historical record. When analyzing the access cases
under an historical approach there is little certainty involved since a creative
reading of history is permitted in every instance. Courts may either choose to
ignore certain historical evidence, or may confuse themselves by lengthy deter-
minations of whether an historical basis of access is sufficient enough to confer
a constitutional right of access.
b. Role of modernization
Additionally, historical analysis does not take into account modernization.
The modernization consideration manifests itself in two ways: the technologi-
cal advances in mass media, and the changes in the trial processes themselves.
In today's electronic age, modernization of the media has resulted in more
intense coverage of news events and more exhaustive investigations of govern-
ment activities, a trend unanticipated by the founding fathers.2 82 As the media
has increased the intensity of its investigations, and as our political culture
constantly moves towards openness and communication, the public also has
come to expect more information.2 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted
that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the
dissenting).
278. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389-91 (1979). See generally Lillian R. BeV-
ier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 311, 325 (1982) (criticizing Richmond Newspapers for its "doctrinal confusion").
279. See Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. CR.-C.L.
L. REV. 579, 610 (1982) (noting that depending upon the judge, various readings of history on the
Federal Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 allow for different applications of habeas relief for individual
prisoners).
280. Paul E. Pompeo, The Jury's Out: A Seventh Amendment Challenge to the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 207 (1990) (demonstrating that the Su-
preme Court has reduced its reliance on historical standards on Seventh Amendment challenges to
administrative proceedings).
281. David Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency for the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 395, 417 (1989) (asserting that use of historical
record for interpretation of Establishment Clause is futile).
282. See Collins, supra note 2, at 760-63. The media today includes free-lance writers, radio
and television broadcasters, magazines, academic and commercial newspapers, book writers, and
any other publishers or broadcasters. See Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different, 7 HOFSTRA L.
RaV 563, 581-83 (1979).
283. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73, 577 n.12 (1980); Collins, supra
note 2, at 760; Rasmussen, supra note 127, at 123.
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First Amendment standards applied to them."' " Technological advances in
communication, as well as transportation, have ended the insularity once pro-
vided by distance, forcing us to confront factors we were once free to ignore. 85
The passage of the Freedom of Information Act and state sunshine laws expli-
cates our compulsion for openness." 6 These changes should be considered in
access determinations, while a focus on history ignores them.
Additionally, the process of criminal investigation and prosecution has
changed fundamentally over the years. 87 Today the focus of many trials can
be at the warrant stage or at pretrial hearings.2 88 As the Third Circuit has
held, "It is clear that the relative importance of pretrial procedure to that of
[the] trial has grown immensely in the last two hundred years."289 A review of
some of the most significant Supreme Court decisions of the past thirty years
in which pretrial proceedings played a central role demonstrates that many
things have been read into pretrial proceedings absent an historical basis. For
instance, pretrial proceedings such as suppression hearings must determine
whether the exclusionary rule must be applied or whether Miranda warnings
have been read to defendants. 90
Many modern pretrial hearings were unheard of at common law or in Eng-
land; thus it is unfair to require a history of access to something that is a
recent development in the court process. 91 Furthermore, even if certain pre-
trial proceedings had existed in England in the Middle Ages, that nation's
restrictive approach to speech casts doubt on an access analysis revolving
around English customs.2 2 By denying a right of access to the judicial process
at an early stage, where a majority of the litigation is disposed of, the public
has essentially been denied a right of access. Historical analysis does not con-
284. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (holding that the immense
reach of radio and television frequencies along with their finite nature permit governmental regu-
lation of their use); see United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Thus ... the first amendment is to be interpreted
in light of current value and conditions."); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 648 (N.J. 1983).
285. Stanley Ingber, The First Amendment in Modern Garb: Retaining System Legitimacy, 56
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187, 189 (1987) (reviewing LUCAS POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987)).
286. Collins, supra note 2, at 760.
287. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (finding that prelimi-
nary hearings had increased in importance in modern times).
288. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573
(8th Cir. 1989); Beth H. Fleming, Comment, First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Criminal Cases, 32 EMORY L.J. 619, 633-34 (1983) (advocating that the focus of the
two-pronged Press-Enterprise II test should be on the "contribution to function" prong).
289. United States v. Criden, 681 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982).
290. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring suppression of defendant's state-
ments to police absent warnings about right to silence and right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (requiring suppression of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures).
291. See Fleming, supra note 288, at 633-34.
292. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (detailing British restraints on speech in the form of seditious libel laws and licensing
statutes).
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sider the changes in the court process itself.
c. Emphasis on English precedent
The historical analysis requires that courts examine ancient case law ap-
proaches to access. Thus they often turn to English case law to determine how
American courts should act.293 This method is of dubious merit since the En-
glish have no corresponding First Amendment and have an erratic history of
protecting freedom of speech and the press.2 94 Injunctions against publication
and extensive government secrecy are viewed as consistent with freedom of
speech in England.2 95 Additionally, the English tradition regarding access to
judicial records has been significantly different from the experience in the
United States. In American courts, individuals seeking access to judicial
records could do so without showing any special need, while in England, nonli-
tigants seeking access to court records were required to demonstrate a proprie-
tary interest in the document or to show a need for the document as evidence
in another lawsuit.2
96
The Supreme Court has previously criticized a blind reliance on British
common law: "[To] assume that English common law in this field [speech
rights] became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical belief that 'one
of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common law on
liberty of speech and of the press.' ",297 Furthermore, American courts have
already turned away from English precedent in areas other than First Amend-
ment law. The Supreme Court has rejected English precedent in admiralty
jurisdiction 2 98 the right against self-incrimination, 99 and recovery of damages
in tort suits.8 00 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that in cases where En-
glish precedent is vague or nonexistent, American courts should not look there
293. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-72 (1980) (surveying British
court system from the Norman Conquest to present); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
419-24 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (surveying British court
system from pre-Norman times to present).
294. James Madison noted, "[T]he freedom of the press and the rights of conscience, those
choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British Constitution." Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1941) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)); see also
Collins, supra note 2, at 761 ("[Nlo constitutional text exists in Britain. Accordingly, the common
law and tradition determine constitutional norms. They accommodate a different view of freedom
of speech and of the press.").
295. Collins, supra note 2, at 761.
296. See Rasmussen, supra note 127, at 123.
297. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941) (quoting Henry Schofield, Freedom of the
Press in the United States, 9 PUBLICATIONS AMER. Soc. Soc'Y 67, 76 (1914)).
298. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 457-59 (1847).
299. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting
an invocation of the right against self-incrimination for subpoenas of a taxpayer's tax information
held by the taxpayer's accountant where the invocation relied on the tide of English precedent on
the subject).
300. See Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 594 (1974).
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at all." °' Additionally, many commentators have argued against reliance on
English precedent for dynamic legal issues such as the rule against perpetu-
ities802 and impeachment law.308 Oliver Wendell Holmes stated the sentiment
most vociferously when he wrote that "it is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV." 30'
Thus, the reliance on English customs regarding free speech issues, and espe-
cially their traditions pursuant to judicial documents such as search warrants
is misapplied.
3. The Balancing Test is Preferable
A balancing approach in the area of search warrant access is the most co-
herent approach. Under the common law qualified right of access, where ac-
cess is presumed, a balancing method already takes place.30 5 The standard
used for balancing should be altered, however. The Supreme Court in Nixon
held that once a common law right of access was created, a balancing ap-
proach was to be applied where all the interests involved should be balanced
equally. However, since decisions like Richmond Newspapers and Press-En-
terprise II, several lower courts have applied a stronger presumption of access
to a common law balancing approach.3 0 The strict scrutiny balancing ap-
proach would ensure access while also protecting other competing interests,
where necessary.
The strict scrutiny balancing approach would be similar to the position
taken by the Baltimore Sun court. There, the court did not find a First
Amendment right of access to the search warrants, but it did find a common
law right of access.3 0 7 Its version of the common law right of access, however,
was potent enough to grant the public the same access privileges as a constitu-
tionally bestowed right of access. 08 The Baltimore Sun approach applies a
strict scrutiny analysis to the common law qualified right of access, so that any
301. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65-66 (1968) (reversing lower court ruling and over-
turning previous Supreme Court holdings that did not permit a habeas corpus challenge by a
consecutive-term prisoner not yet serving sentence for a later criminal conviction, and instead
holding that previous decisions relied on English historical interpretations of habeas relief al-
though -English courts did not use consecutive-term prison sentences).
302. See, e.g., Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH.
L. REV. 323, 336 (1990) (arguing for the rejection of English precedents on the rule against
perpetuities).
303. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68
TEx. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (citing IRVING R. BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 3-23 (1972)
(arguing for a diminished role for English precedent in Congress' impeachment powers)).
304. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (argu-
ing for a greater reliance on economics in law rather than on historical standards).
305. See generally Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the court is to balance the various interests with its "sound discretion").
306. Id.; see supra notes 129-31 (discussing lower court holdings granting a strong presumption
of access).
307. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 64-65.
308. Id.
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interest competing with the right of access must be compelling and narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.8 0 9 This approach makes the difference between
the common law right of access and the First Amendment right of access non-
existent. Both the First Amendment and common law rights of access would
presume disclosure and require compelling, narrowly tailored reasons to deny
access.
To determine whether a First Amendment right of access to search war-
rants exists, the two-pronged test should be abandoned. The test is designed
for judicial hearings, and application of the test to judicial records that are not
integral to a particular proceeding leads to questionable reasoning on the part
of the courts.810 Since documents such as search warrants have a limited his-
torical record, the application of the "history-of-access" requirement to docu-
ments is inconsistent with the contemporary ideals of openness.811 Instead, a
court should presume the existence of both a First Amendment and common
law qualified right of access to search warrants and apply a balancing ap-
proach in which only compelling interests would overcome the presumption of
access.
The balancing approach that presumes access offers more advantages than
an approach relying on historical standards of access. A balancing approach
would take into account the modernization of the media and the contemporary
values held by citizens who seek expanded knowledge about the criminal jus-
tice system and the government as a whole. 812 The balancing approach also
allows increased access to certain judicial functions or documents that have no
tradition of openness due to their relative unimportance in the past.8 3 Finally,
the balancing approach would reflect public concern for cases involving mas-
sive governmental investigations or improprieties in major industries supported
by taxpayers.
B. Application: The Weighing of Interests
Unlike the Press-Enterprise H test, a balancing approach would presume
that a First Amendment and common law qualified right of access exists to
search warrants. Thus, when applying the test the focus would be only on
balancing of interests.
In search warrant cases the weighing of interests must be done on a case-by-
case basis. But by applying a strict scrutiny balancing test, access would be
more likely. The strict scrutiny test that is applied when a qualified First
Amendment right of access is found would require courts to find less restric-
309. Id. at 65.
310. Note how the search warrant access courts analogized search warrants to suppression
hearings and warrant proceedings without explaining why they choose those particular proceed-
ings as their benchmarks. See supra notes 214, 231, 236 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 152, 153 and accompanying text (detailing the historical record of search
warrants).




tive alternatives to nondisclosure and require a compelling interest to overcome
the presumption of access. By requiring less restrictive alternatives, the public
could gain access to at least a reduced portion of the search warrants or
affidavits.
Public access insures benefits to the court system and society in general.
Judicial and prosecutorial misconduct can be abated with public scrutiny of
the warrant process, thereby benefitting both the court system and the warrant
process."' Society in general benefits from access since citizens can check
their government more effectively, either by seeing what the government is
investigating or observing the actions of publicly funded industries.1 5 Society
also profits from the therapeutic value of open justice and from the educa-
tional role that access to the court system provides. 16
The benefits of access must be balanced, however, against the concerns of
both the searched individual and the government. The searched individual's
privacy and reputation interests are important. However, in order to accord
proper deference to the interests of access, a higher standard of proof of harm
should be applied to an individual's privacy concerns. A searched individual
should be made to prove that information contained in the search warrants
invades his or her privacy to such an extent that it rises to the level of "inten-
sified pain," as opposed to the approach that only requires a showing of em-
barrassment.3 17 The intensified-pain standard would not permit closure be-
cause of unflattering or negative information about an individual unless it
dealt with intimate or libelous statements or recordings. The intensified-pain
standard is especially appropriate when the searched individual has been act-
ing in a capacity as an employee of a corporation. 8 ' A high standard of dam-
ages in privacy invasions would balance the interests of the individual and the
public in the most effective way. The higher standard would recognize the
public's legitimate interest in knowledge of governmental activities, while still
protecting those individuals who would suffer emotional trauma from the dis-
closure of private information.
The governmental interest in law enforcement is important also, and cer-
tainly the public reaps benefits from successful law enforcement activities.
However, there must be a point where the concern for effective law enforce-
ment is outweighed by the public's interest in the information.319 The prolifer-
314. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573
(8th Cir. 1988).
315. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (noting that the public may have an interest in
seeing how the government chooses to spend its tax dollars).
316. See Richmond Newspaper v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1978).
317. See supra note 177 (noting that some courts have held that only information causing
"intensified pain" to an individual can be suppressed).
318. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (noting that courts are less willing to
protect corporate privacy or reputation interests than the privacy interests of individuals).
319. The determination of whether the government's interest in law enforcement still exists
should be made by the court (rather than for the court to wait until the government tells the court
that its interest no longer exists), and it might vary from case to case. However, logic dictates that
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ation of sealing orders involving governmental investigations could prevent the
public from seeing potential governmental misconduct in investigations or gov-
ernmental failures in law enforcement. Although law enforcement is crucial to
a civilized society, the power to enforce the law cannot be accorded to persons
or organizations without the existence of checks in the system so that the pub-
lic can determine whether the power is exercised properly. The most effective
check is public scrutiny.
When determining whether a compelling interest that would overcome the
presumption of access exists, courts should give great deference to the First
Amendment issues that the Supreme Court outlined in its line of court access
cases.
CONCLUSION
Initially, courts were reluctant to recognize a right for citizens to gain ac-
cess to information or places. However, as First Amendment theory
progressed, the Supreme Court recognized a structural aspect to the First
Amendment that allowed citizens to receive and acquire information, since
this form of communication was crucial to the duty of its citizens to govern
themselves. The Supreme Court has been most active in applying this right to
acquire information in judicial proceedings where access to trials and pretrial
proceedings is guaranteed. However, the Court has not found the opportunity
to extend this right of access to judicial documents. To preserve and advance
the tenets expressed in the court access cases, this right should be extended to
judicial documents. Search warrants must be included among those documents
that merit accessibility.
Currently, requests for access to sealed search warrants are analyzed under
the Press-Enterprise II standard. From both a legal and an analytical stand-
point, the application of this standard to search warrants is undesirable. The
approach has led to questionable reasoning by the various circuit courts of
appeals that have reviewed requests for access to search warrants. Lower
courts, assigned the task of determining whether certain search warrants
should be sealed, have received the message that access should or should not
exist depending on the integral proceeding to which they choose to apply the
two-pronged test. Thus, a lower court can basically choose whether to allow
access, and then apply the two-pronged test to the proceeding that happens to
fit their desired result. If a court opposes access, it can apply the two-pronged
test to warrant issuance proceedings and find no tradition of access; if a court
favors access, it can apply the test to suppression hearings and find a history of
access. This lack of predictability is unacceptable because it will allow courts
to decide access issues based on their predilections towards First Amendment
theory and the media. Alternatively, a presumption of access, which has both
in large governmental investigations, the secrecy of their operation is short-lived since so many
people are involved, and the media has access to at least press releases that might give clues to the
scope of the probe and possible targets.
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First Amendment and common law endorsement, would create predictability
within the court access case law. The presumption of access would reflect
modern American concepts of openness and knowledge of governmental activi-
ties. Without a presumption of access, a trend toward granting sealing orders
in criminal cases could begin, a trend already recognized in civil litigation.
A proliferation of sealing orders in criminal cases is undesirable. Sealing
search warrants prevents the public from profiting from the benefits conferred
by knowledge of governmental activities. By being denied access to search
warrants involved in massive governmental investigations the public is ren-
dered unaware of the activities of its law enforcement representatives. If the
public is given greater access rights to search warrants it will be able to better
monitor these law enforcement activities. Increased access potential will allow
the public to act as a check on governmental misconduct or malfeasance. Ad-
ditionally, denial of access to search warrants involving investigations of indus-
tries that are publicly financed fails to allow the public to see what becomes of
its tax dollars. Generally, any increased access rights would serve educational
and therapeutic purposes also. The public would have more knowledge of its
judicial system and the warrant process, and this understanding would help in
preserving these systems. The public would also be aware that the government
is taking law enforcement actions so the public can perceive that justice is
being served.
Under the current system the government has been able to place itself in a
shroud of secrecy. The only details from governmental law enforcement activi-
ties that are available to the public are those that the government chooses to
release to the public in press releases. If courts granted the public a right to
access at an earlier stage of the criminal justice process the government would
be held more accountable. A lack of accountability is threatening because of
the potential for judicial and prosecutorial misconduct.
A presumption of access would create consistency in court evaluations of
access requests to search warrants, and would provide the benefits of public
awareness of governmental activities. A system of secrecy in government and
the courts is not consonant with today's expectations of openness. The pre-
sumption of access to search warrants and discouragement of sealing orders in
general would enable citizens to better exercise their privilege of self-
government.
Peter G. Blumberg
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